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Revolution: the only solution 
Sign, Manama, Bahrain (March 2011) 
 
Burials and Beginnings 
You must go back into history, that history of men damned by 
other men. 
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
What better way to celebrate, commemorate, critically reflect on, and think 
through Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth fifty years after its publication with 
a new North African syndrome:1 Revolution—or at least a series of revolts 
that continue to rock regimes across North Africa and the region.  Fanon 
begins The Wretched writing of decolonization as a program of complete 
disorder, an overturning of order—often against the odds—willed from the 
bottom up. Without time or space for a transition, there is instead an 
absolute replacement of one “species” of humanity by another.2  
In periods of revolution, like the one we are experiencing today, such 
absolutes appear quite normal. Indeed, radical change becomes the “new 
normal” and the idea that revolutionary change is impossible is simply the 
rantings and ravings of the conservatives and reactionaries of the ancient 
regime.  
Too long buried under the weight of the tomes of academic discourse, 
Fanon has been resuscitated by the new dawn of North African revolutions. 
To celebrate Fanon, the revolutionary, all of a sudden seems contemporary 
and pertinent, while the musings of the critics who consigned him to 
postcolonial oblivion seem out of touch. But rather than continuing the 
painstaking work of exhuming Fanon from the postcolonial burial site,3 let 
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us turn a commemoration of Fanon into an event. Indeed, why assume that 
a commemoration of Fanon after fifty years is not critical? Moreover why 
begin a contemporary engagement with Fanon assuming a priori the limits of 
his thought? 
Indeed, where to begin is a philosophic question. It is a question of 
“intention” as Edward Said puts it in one of his most radical and Vicoian 
works. Beginnings are revolutionary, implying return and repetition and, 
following Said, “a sort of historical dialectic that changes its character and 
meaning.”4 Vico, Said argues “said that the word human comes from root to 
bury” suggesting that “his humanistic philosophy” contained “elements of 
its own negation.”5  
 
A new humanism? 
“Liberty or death,” a slogan of revolutionary struggles against the odds from 
the American Revolution, undergirds the current Arab revolts, but is also 
based on a mathematical certainty as expressed in Shelley’s poetry, “yea are 
many, they are few.”  And so Fanon begins The Wretched not simply with 
violence but concerning violence in the context of colonial brutality and 
revolutionary transformation, of total disorder, where the last shall be first. 
Fanon’s decolonial philosophy can be considered a critique of the order of 
European “civilization,” of universalistic, imperialistic man. Called a new 
humanism developed from the bottom up, Fanon’s philosophy has an 
element of its own movement of negativity in the quest for freedom.6 His 
concrete universal of human freedom, expressed at the 1956 first congress of 
Black Writers, was a call to “fight all forms of exploitation ... and alienation.” 
And though he did not mention Algeria, Fanon’s commitment to the 
Algerian revolution was obvious in his conclusions:   
The logical end of this will to struggle is the total liberation of the 
national territory. In order to achieve this liberation the inferiorized 
man brings all his resources into play, all his acquisitions, the old 
and the new, his own and those of the occupant. The struggle is at 
once total, absolute.7  
Grounded in revolutionary Africa, Fanon’s critique of Europe built on 
colonial expropriation, exploitation, racism and exclusion is absolute and 
universal. Demanding that we turn away from Europe, he calls a decolonial 
(new) humanism an “untidy idea propounded as an absolute.”8 “At whatever 
level we study it,” Fanon opens The Wretched, “decolonization is quite 
simply the replacing of a certain ‘species’ of men by another ‘species’ of 
men.  Without any period of transition, there is a total, complete, and an 
absolute substitution.”9 The beginning emerges in a violent rupture with the 
past. But what Fanon also calls a “second phase of total liberation”10 is a 
notion of freedom and human dignity created by the authentic liberation of 
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the wretched of the earth, which equates with the collective actions of those 
hitherto damned, uncounted, and dehumanized people becoming historical 
protagonists, turning the world upside down. “An authentic national 
liberation,” he adds, “exists only to the degree to which the individual has 
irreversibly begun his own liberation.”11 Europe had to be left not because it 
was materialistic, but because its materialism was based on alienation and 
separation, on the expropriation, exploitation, and indeed murder of 
humanity. Fanon’s new humanism is thus defined by “the existence of men 
and women who truly liberated, who are truly masters of all the material 
means which makes possible the radical transformation of society.”12  
 In other words, Fanon’s notion of a second phase of liberation describes 
the self-activity and self-bringing forth of liberty as the phenomenology of 
liberation. Autonomous time is created by bodies which are no longer 
hemmed in and constrained, but freely thinking and moving through space. 
A democracy from below is developed by the will of the people by their own 
power.  To accomplish this new beginning, the African revolution could not 
return to the past but would have to “let the dead bury the dead,” as Fanon 
quotes Marx as the epigraph to his “in lieu of a conclusion” to Black Skin 
White Masks. Marx continued in the 18th Brumaire that these new revolutions 
would have to “criticize themselves continually ... deride with unmerciful 
thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltriness of their first 
attempts.”13 Addressing these inadequacies and weaknesses is certainly 
what Fanon attempts to do in The Wretched. 
L'an V de la révolution Algérienne  (Year Five of the Algerian revolution), 
titled after the revolutionary calendar of the French revolution and later 
called Sociologie d'une Revolution (The Sociology of Revolution) and published 
as A Dying Colonialism in English, is grounded in what Fanon call the 
“radical mutation” in consciousness and social relations that an anticolonial 
revolution creates –the thesis that people change as they change the world14 
– as it draws on the people’s “hidden resources” and their social creativity as 
new revolutionary subjectivities.  The book reflects the insurrectionary 
moment of the Algerian revolution and attempts to work out in practice the 
ways in which society is being reconstituted. Fanon begins the work 
claiming that “The Algerian nation is no longer in future heaven” but 
already existing in the heart of the Algerian people.15 The Wretched of the 
Earth, published only two years later, made a number of essential further 
contributions. For Fanon, like Rosa Luxemburg, “the revolution was 
magnificent and everything was bilge.”16 Rather than the end of the 
dialectic, the revolution became the ground for a Fanonian epistemology. 
 
The politics of negotiation 
This sleep-cure used on the people may sometimes be successful; 
thus out of the conference around the green baize table comes the 
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political agenda which enables Monsieur Mba, the President of 
Gabon to state in all seriousness on his arrival in Paris for an official 
visit: “Gabon is independent, but between Gabon and France 
nothing is changed.” 
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
If it is the insurrectionary mobilizations of the rural and urban poor which 
become the epistemological dividing line on which The Wretched is 
grounded, then finding their own voices and means of communication 
(including linkages with intellectuals and militants from the cities) becomes 
crucial. But what are the forces aligned against them?  The anticolonial 
rebellions create continual panic among the colonial and metropolitan elite 
who, along with their willingness to constantly threaten an endgame based 
on the military option, begin to enter into strategic negotiations with 
colonized elites about a “postcolonial” pacted transition. Even as political 
activity is banned and leaders of nationalist parties imprisoned, there 
continues to be informal contact with those the regime (or at least the more 
liberal element) considers moderates. During periods of quiescence these are 
nothing but patronizing dialogues, but what pushes the colonial reformists 
to search out moderate nationalists is their fear that everything will be lost to 
mass movements. In the final analysis the strategy of elite negotiation is a 
zero-sum game; whatever is “won” is won at the cost of demobilizing and 
depoliticizing the mass movement and by reducing politics to technical and 
legal issues. Through an admixture of incorporation and repression, Fanon 
argues, elite negotiations necessitate that the mass movements are sent back 
to the caves.17 Of course, these pre-emptive negotiations are often backed by 
the ex-colonial powers (especially the former colonial powers as well as the 
U.S. who act as brokers) and though the actual content of the transition may 
well depends on a number of strategic factors (including the relative power 
of participants and the relative openness of the negotiations), the form 
remains directive with economic interests (especially access to “natural” 
resources) determinant. For Fanon, therefore, a new political dispensation 
cannot be built on the politics of elite negotiation. A new politics, instead, 
must be promoted and must be based in the ways in which the colonized, 
dehumanized, and formerly motionless—the damned of the earth—become 
human, actional and self-determining. Thus Fanon is concerned with 
moving beyond a knee-jerk anti-imperialism.  He remains committed to the 
principle that any freedom given by the colonial master or given in the 
master’s terms can be neither “authentic” nor liberating.18 Instead, the kind 
of “work” necessary to gain “a mind of one’s own” can only occur in a 
struggle which finds its own content. Refusing to be a “slave of the past,” to 
rely on memories of the past, Fanon rejects anything that defines him by the 
other, which includes being defined in reaction to the other. Instead he insists 
that existence be defined in a leap that creates its own foundation beyond 
the instrumental and the contingent.19
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depends on the ability of the oppressed to bring every resource into play, 
“the old and the new, his own and those of the occupant.” 
There is quite a bit of truth to the subtitle of the 1960s U.S. editions of 
The Wretched as “the handbook for the third world revolution,”20 but it is 
little understood by situating Fanon as a product of the time. The Wretched is 
also a tactical manual in the adventure of revolutionary politics. It is a 
warning to intellectuals who support decolonization to develop the 
epistemology of the revolt, not simply by a theoretical critique but by 
shifting the ground of reason toward those who have been considered 
completely beyond the pale of reason develop a new basis for praxis. Yet 
Fanon argues that one of the problems in the decolonization struggle was 
the willingness of many intellectuals and self-proclaimed leaders to continue 
to think in a Manichean framework (this is a particular characteristic of 
intellectuals who have only recently broken with the principle of the 
“backwardness of the masses”).  Manicheanism, which can be expressed in a 
rigidity of thinking and action, of agitation and withdrawal, is a result of the 
multiple traumas of colonialism. Among colonized intellectuals this trauma 
and alienation is expressed through a rejection of “indigenous” culture and 
an internalization of the “Greco-Latin pedestal.”21 During the decolonization 
period this attitude swings the other way, rejecting everything associated 
with the colonial culture and uncritically embrace of every “indigenous” 
action. Thus the Manichean framework continues. The intellectual who 
discovers the bravery of the masses can go from heralding the new society 
already in existence to fearing, without a clear understanding of the 
situation, that all is lost or that military technology is the answer to all 
problems.22 This rigid and reactive thinking means that those who had in a 
moment of exuberance optimistically believe that the revolution could be 
won in one fell swoop soon become downhearted and pessimistic when 
faced with tactical losses. Clearly, for Fanon, the intellectual is in need of 
political education, a kind of sociotherapy where there is a genuine and 
open discussions within the movement.  But into this confusing whirlpool, 
the enemy changes tack, Fanon argues, and the politics of reform and 
negotiation reappear. Nationalism, which had been a unifying slogan, 
appears increasingly threadbare with nationalist politicians peddling a 
rhetoric based on race or “tribe” but offering no real political or social 
program. The politicians speak of “we Arabs, we Blacks” and in 
“profoundly ambivalent” terms which “make the people dream dreams ... 
[but] avoid the actual overthrowing of the state.”23 But the state must be 
overthrown. For Fanon, the revolutionary maturity of the resistance also 
means that a critique of spontaneous impetuosity, on one hand, and an over-
reliance on a military model on the other becomes a practical need.  The 
Manichean certainties that had fueled the initial movement must break apart 
because the “native” / “settler” binary that powered the early resistance 
(and seemed to power Fanon’s analysis)24 are ultimately regressive and can 
only lead to defeat.  Slogans and sayings will not suffice to raise 
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consciousness25 as it becomes clear that not all “settlers” are enemies and 
that “exploitation can wear a black face or an Arab one.”26 Fanon concludes 
that Manicheanistic thinking, the brutal thought typical of revolutions, 
“inevitably leads to defeat.”27 “Political education”—genuine dialogue—and 
space for a more nuanced politics and time for the movement to develop 
inclusive political analyses become necessities just when having time and 
opening up new space becomes more difficult. Tactically it might be a 
moment to go underground, but strategically the movement kept to its 
principle of grassroots democracy. Thus becoming part of the “school of the 
people” is not easy, especially pressured by the tactics of the day to day, but 
the answer to the future can only begin by asking new questions grounded 
in people’s needs, namely land, bread, freedom and dignity. Without a 
humanist program, without including “men and women ... in enlightened 
and fruitful work,” without giving back “dignity to all citizens” and filling 
“their minds and ... eyes with human things,” the struggle for national 
liberation becomes a “sterile formalism.”28 We have to return to the 
beginning. 
 
The Egyptian moment: The revolution in our minds 
Decolonization, as we know is a historical process ... the thing 
becomes Man during the same process by which it frees itself.  
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
What determines the timing of when the lid blows off, Fanon asks in The 
Wretched? In spite of everything, he says, ideas flow across frontiers and 
people begin again “to make history.”29  The Egyptian revolution is dated 
January 25th, 2011, but its prehistory includes years of labor struggle: the sit-
ins, strikes, and demonstrations of 2006, the almost daily workers’ actions of 
early 2007, the massive strike of textile workers in Muhalla al-Kubra in 2008 
initiated by working women and the bread revolts of the same year.   
During the insurrectionary moment of “Tahrir Square,” the Egyptian 
people opened up political space, as an ongoing public debate in the 
squares, outside the parliament, in the streets. Cairo, a city of 18 million – 
abundant in its history and riches and also in the lived realities of the 
majority of its citizens who are poor – became associated throughout the 
world, and especially the Arab world, with liberation. Caireans showed the 
world how social media relates to social transformation and the retaking of 
public space. They implicitly brought into focus the idea of the “right to the 
city” as a collective project of social transformation. They were not stopped 
by fears about maintaining order, nor by the police and the state’s paid 
murderers, or by threats of a coup. Instead they organized a continuous 
occupation of a city’s central square by tens, then hundreds of thousands, 
then millions of people, defending it, feeding it, nurturing it, articulating it, 
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and developing it as their daily work. Clearly things were changing during 
those eighteen days after January 25th and the speed of change was 
manifested in the people’s experience of solidarity and fearlessness. But once 
the mind of the oppressed experiences freedom – not as an abstraction but in 
and through collective actions – it also becomes a force of revolution. 
Fanon’s Marxist opinion that people change as they change the world 
became reality: “They were scared. They are no longer scared,” many 
argued, wondering why it had taken so long.  “When we stopped being 
afraid we knew we would win. We will not again allow ourselves to be 
scared of a government. This is the revolution in our country, the revolution 
in our minds.”30  
Once the lid is taken off a police state, it is very difficult to put back on. 
Once Mubarak’s violence was unsuccessful, the generals made a strategic 
decision to manoeuvre a post-Mubarak outcome.31 But what influenced their 
decision was the people’s liberation from fear. Fanon insists that it is the 
mental liberation and the radical change in consciousness that accompanies 
revolution, begins the process of rethinking everything, questioning 
everything that has been hitherto taken for granted.32 What had been normal 
for so long is fundamentally shaken. After thirty years of life under a 
dictatorship, the Egyptian people, too long hemmed in by the secret police, 
became actional beings. Tahrir Square, the revolution’s focal point, became 
territorialized by those who had formerly not counted at all as the poor 
joined the festival. It became the space for a new kind of work in Fanon’s 
sense, namely the hard but collectively joyous work of human liberation. As 
Sinan Antoon, the Iraqi born poet, novelist and filmmaker put it, “What 
distinguishes this revolution is the wonderful and sublime example it sets in 
terms of solidarity among protesters and citizens at large. The spontaneity 
and cooperation in managing their daily affairs without a hierarchy is what 
the state didn’t expect as it deprived the people of basic services and tried to 
spread fear and chaos to terrorize the citizenry.” The “commune” at Tahrir 
Square produced a new political form.33 After Mubarak was forced out, 
Tahrir Square was “cleared” and as the movement reached its first turning 
point, no longer united by what it was against, one possibility was to 
become united by what it had created. The Argentinian social theorist Raul 
Zibechi characterizes the moment of insurrection as “times in which there is 
an intensely creative outpouring – during which social groups release huge 
amounts of energy – act like a bolt of lightning capable of illuminating 
subterranean molecular cooperation, hidden by the veil of everyday inertias 
that are imposed ... by domination and subordination.”34 Fanon similarly 
begins Year 5 with the chapter “Algeria unveils itself” (Algérie se dévoile) 
discussing how the insurrection engenders a movement toward social 
liberation. For Fanon, woman’s actions, transgressing the boundaries of the 
city as well as the boundaries of her family and becoming aware of herself as 
a body time and in space, express a radical new beginning that went to the 
root of decolonized social relations. The point is not to wax elegiac about 
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this moment as if it is simply a beautiful memory. In a sense Tahrir Square 
has become deterritorialized. It is a concept born of practice, not a sacred 
space. In his critique of spontaneity in The Wretched, Fanon argues that there 
is no privileged territorial position. Yet in the process of territorialization 
and deterritorialization, how can the revolution hold onto its 
epistemological moment?  
 
Individualism, national liberation and the new citizenship 
It is a question of the Third World starting a new history of Man. 
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
It turns out that the greatest threat to African revolution has not simply been 
the small “Western” educated colonized elite but a narrow and often 
populist ethnicized nationalism. Ethnic and religious identities and 
patronage systems are essential to colonial governance and while many 
identities precede European colonialism, they are reimagined, ordered and 
institutionalized by the colonial regimes. Identity becomes inert, reproduced 
and often times authenticated by colonial power and patronage into a static 
and ordered system through which life is lived (not only through identity 
cards, movement, and labor but also over issues of land, inheritance, and so 
forth).  A powerful force of anticolonial mobilizations, a politics based solely 
around identity, becomes a “misadventure” with disastrous consequences. 
The newly independent nation is crippled from the start; rather than a 
liberating ideology based in democratic practices, subjugation continues 
through religious and ethnic entrepreneurs and politicians who continue to 
peddle “primitive manicheanism.”35 Fanon argues that religious tension, 
often at the root of the “commonest racial feeling,” is “stiffened” by the 
nationalist bourgeoisie’s “laziness and will to imitation.”36 The point is that 
the bourgeoisie is bankrupt, unable to put into “practice a program with 
even a minimum humanist content.”37 Where the western bourgeoisie 
proclaims equality and practices contempt toward the Arab and the Black, 
the “young nationalist bourgeoisie,” he adds, peddles a “racism of contempt 
... no different from tribalism.”38 In this context Fanon writes of the 
importance of tourism to the neo-colonial economy. Fifty years later the 
state, the military, the party and local entrepreneurs continue to play a 
crucial supporting role in promoting commodified indigenity, reproducing 
hierarchies and inequalities that colonialism took over and created.  Thus 
achieving anything, Fanon concludes, can only done “in defiance of the 
interests of the bourgeoisie” and in defiance of the interests of local and 
global capitalism.   
Fanon’s critique of the nationalist bourgeoisie and its uselessness as an 
innovative class have become axiomatic with nationalism reduced to flag 
waving global corporate sports events (for example, the World Cup in South 
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Africa, or the Olympics in Brazil) with the state playing the role of easing the 
way for the spectacular event, which often uses its forces to remove poor 
people from the cities. However, as much as nationalism is simply a veneer 
of neoliberal capitalism, the recent North African “syndrome” indicates how 
the national consciousness can be taken over and imagined in a more a 
radical form. In the name of “the nation,” the North Africa revolts have 
equated national consciousness with justice, dignity, freedom and equality. 
In the same way, Fanon contrasts the crude attitudes of the incipient 
bourgeoisie and colonized middle class, who consider the struggle an 
opportunity to take the place of the colonizer, to the new sense of 
comradeship and solidarity emanating from the anticolonial movement and 
heralds the collective resistance inherent in social forms that have predated 
colonialism. As much as he praises the history of resistance keeping alive 
“revolutionary zeal,” the new society becomes evident in the radical 
mutation these forms undergo as the local community “spreads its own light 
and own reason”39 and as new social relations emerge from new collective 
actions and discussions.40  
A new sense of collectivity and solidarity is crucial to building the new 
nation and Fanon contrasts the possessive individualist imperative of 
bourgeois society to the sense of comradeship that is emerging from the 
practices of the revolutionary movement (i.e. the moment of “Tahrir”). 
However, he insists that liberation cannot be obtained by subsuming the 
individual to the collective either in theory or in practice. The individual 
remains the social entity. And while he argues in Black Skin that the 
individual’s situation could only be understood “socio-diagnostically,” the 
goal remains the disalienation of the individual. “Total liberation” and the 
release of creativity, he argues in The Wretched, “concerns all sectors of the 
personality.”41 Thus Fanon’s aim for the total liberation of the human 
individual is not simply a liberation from the social-political order. 
Everybody’s individual creativity counts and it is the creative energy of the 
masses that becomes the measure of national liberation. Therefore, the 
recollection of the past is not only a reconnection with a time before 
colonialism but also the anticipation of the future as the birth of historical 
time. The collective democracy of the local village communes, for example, 
would therefore have to be regenerated, indeed transformed, by the 
transformation of society of which they are a part, so that nobody could be 
excluded. 42   
Burying the reactive and ascriptive politics of identity, Fanon suggests a 
new beginning where “everything needs to be started over again.”43  
Concretely, for Fanon, national liberation meant not just citizenship for 
everyone, but an active citizenship—without reference to anything else, 
without any claim to indigeneity—who would be involved in and 
synonymous with the creation of a new society. It was not a future dream 
but, he believed, already happening: “in the new society that is being built, there 
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are only Algerians.  From the outset, therefore, every individual living in Algeria is 
an Algerian.”44 
Fanon’s optimism was born from the optimism that radical changes in 
social relations derived not from an “objective dialectic” of a dying 
colonialism but from the “effective solidarity” that was killing off the old 
society: 
The optimism that prevails today in Africa is not an optimism born of 
the spectacle of the forces of nature that are at last favorable to Africans.  
Nor is the optimism due to the discovery in the former oppressor of a less 
inhuman and more kindly state of mind.  Optimism in Africa is the direct 
product of the revolutionary action of the masses.45  
 
Whether this truth is real? 
Yet Fanon warns in The Wretched that all progressive organisations, parties 
and social movements can degenerate. Just as organizations of national 
liberation can become chauvinistic, so too can democratic movements 
become professionalized and authoritaritarian. The dialectic of 
transformation into its opposite is, however, neither an iron law nor simply 
the result of external pressure. In fact, inasmuch as Fanon believes that it is 
the subjective powers – namely, the hands and brains – of Africans that will 
create new beginnings on the continent, Fanon’s idea of a new humanism 
insists on absolute vigilance and checking practice by principle. The 
achievements of liberation movements become part of the struggle’s history; 
they are never lost, even if the movements later degenerate. In the colonial 
context, Fanon argues, there is no truthful behavior. But there is a veractity 
for Fanon: the poor, the unemployed, the excluded, in short the damned of 
the earth, are “the truth” because they express the truth of the “national 
cause,” namely promised land, promised bread and promised freedom. In 
the colonial situation, the colonizer paints the colonized as the quintessence 
of evil and the colonized return in kind. What is good is simply what hurts 
the colonist. But beyond good and evil, truth is whatever fosters the end of 
the living death of colonialism. Truth is what puts Africa in motion behind 
revolutionary principles.46  Yet, aware of the counter-revolution that lurks 
inside as well as outside the movement—its transformation into its 
opposite—Fanon’s notion of dialectical negativity means that a new 
humanism draws itself not simply in reaction to postcolonial realities in 
their neoliberal form, but also as a resumption of an interrupted history. 
Thus, when Fanon states that the unemployed, the poor, don’t represent the 
truth but are the truth in their being,47 he constrasts this to the inventory of 
“true representations” created by the intellectual. These representations, 
always external to the people’s real movement, are “reminiscent of death 
rather than life,” he argues, because they reflect the legacies of colonialism. 
The need to break with such assumptions and establish a decolonial and 
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dialectical praxis is intimately connected with Fanon’s critique of the idea of 
an objective Truth that towers above human society. And, Fanon adds, “we 
have every right to ask ourselves whether this truth is real.”48 Subjectivity, 
which Fanon equates with the freedom of the whole person, the creative, 
thinking, feeling human being, is the truth which through praxis absorbs 
objectivity and changes the world.  
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